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Background: Major investments by development partners in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) often seek
to develop a supportive policy environment. There is limited knowledge about the mechanisms that development
partners use to influence government policy, or which mechanisms are effective. This study assessed the influence
of Avahan, a large HIV/AIDS prevention program in India supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, on
the development of HIV/AIDS policies in India, particularly the National AIDS Control Program III (NACP III).
Methods: A retrospective assessment of the contributions of Avahan to the development of NACP III was
conducted based upon document review and in-depth interviews with key informants, including Avahan staff and
staff of implementing partners. This assessment was carried out within a framework centered on three domains:
evidence considered by policy and decision-makers; the channel through which influence is exerted; and the target
audience for influence.
Results: Respondents identified a number of respects in which Avahan influenced NACP III policy, notably, Avahan
influenced perception of the feasibility of scaling up services (through a demonstration effect) and Avahan, along
with others, helped ensure a strong focus on targeted interventions. Overall Avahan’s influence was greatest during
policy implementation. While the extent to which research evidence generated by Avahan influenced NACP III was
limited, best practice evidence generated by Avahan, including the lessons learned from routine implementation
and management, contributed significantly to NACP III. This was largely due to the credibility Avahan had
established and strategic ‘inside track’ communications.
Conclusion: While studies of knowledge translation typically focus primarily on scientific evidence, this study
suggests that other forms of evidence, notably best practice evidence derived from program experience, and
disseminated through personal communication, were particularly influential. The framework developed for the
paper provides a useful tool to analyze how evidence-based influence is exerted.
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In many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
development partners are often thought to be highly in-
fluential in terms of shaping government policies and
priorities. Analysts have suggested that the financial
clout of such development partners is the primary
source of their influence [1,2]. However it has also been* Correspondence: sbennett@jhsph.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orshown that aid conditionality (whereby the disbursement
of aid is contingent upon specific policy reforms) is un-
likely to be effective without buy-in from the national
government [3,4]. Donor influence may be based upon
different sources of power, including access to informa-
tion and expertise, and many development partners seek
to employ evidence and expertise to inform and shape
policy debates. Indeed, Morrissey argues that a key role
for aid is to inform and support policy processes [3].
There is relatively limited academic or empirical work
that explores the processes through which developmentd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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ment policy, and much of the available literature focuses
on how research evidence may influence policy [5-7].
However there are multiple other forms of evidence -
tacit or experiential knowledge, best practice knowledge,
norms, and guidelines - that may also influence policy
and decision making. This study sought to understand
how one particular development program, the Avahan
program, supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-
dation (BMGF), used evidence, in its various forms, to
influence national aids control policy in India.
Initiated in 2003 (see Figure 1), the Avahan program
represents a major investment by BMGF to address the
spread of HIV/AIDS in India. While supporting service
provision in the six high-prevalence states at the time
(four southern states: Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
Maharashtra, and Karnataka and two north eastern
states: Manipur and Nagaland), the Avahan program has
also sought to influence national policy. In particular,
the program has sought to maintain a focus on most at-
risk populations, and the scale-up of effective HIV/AIDS
prevention services to address the needs of these popula-
tions. During the life of the Avahan program, the main
HIV/AIDS policy framework in India has been the Na-
tional AIDS Control Program III (NACP III) (NACO
2006). This 250-page policy document, developed during
2005, provides a comprehensive description of national
AIDS control policies in India. Our analysis focuses in
particular on the influence of Avahan on the develop-
ment and implementation of NACP III.
Conceptual framework
We developed a conceptual framework that draws upon
previous publications in this field [8,9] to describe how the
Avahan program may have influenced the development ofFigure 1 Timeline for development of Avahan and NACP III.NACP III. This framework (Figure 2) is centered on three
domains: evidence considered by policy and decision-
makers; the channel through which influence is exerted;
and the target audience for influence. The framework
identifies three levels of change where influence can be
observed:
1. Changes at the individual level, such as shifts in
attitudes, which may not always be reflected in
policy or practice, but are nonetheless an important
indicator of influence and may be a precursor to
other types of change.
2. Changes in policy, such as formal rules and
regulations governing programs at the national,
state, or local levels.
3. Changes in practice, which are needed for policies to
have an impact and can relate to activities ranging
from clinical to management.
All of these changes occur within a specific social, pol-
itical, and economic environment.
Our framework considers three categories of evidence,
acknowledging that there may be some overlap and
interaction between these different categories:
1. Research evidence including results from dedicated
studies that seek to address specific questions,
analysis of epidemiological or survey data, modeling,
or syntheses of existing evidence. This type of
evidence is generally disseminated through peer-
reviewed publications and scientific meetings.
2. Best practice evidence comes from practice and
represents practical learning from the field. This
includes learning and data that are gathered through
routine program management activities. Although
Figure 2 Conceptual framework.
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reviewed literature, they do not represent findings
from dedicated research activities and are more
often published in the form of monographs/reports,
and shared through conferences, meetings, and site
visits along with other forms of personal
communication.
3. Tacit knowledge represents learning generated from
personal experiences [10]. It may often be
introduced into the decision-making process by civil
society organizations to ensure that the experiences
of vulnerable populations are considered, but also
includes the tacit knowledge of program managers
and other implementers.
The target audience for influence includes policy
makers, civil society, and multi- and bi-lateral organiza-
tions. While government policy makers take primary re-
sponsibility for policy formulation and implementation,
the other actors may influence policy [11,12]. The up-
take of evidence and its consideration in the decision-
making process is further influenced by the credibility of
the source of evidence and the channel through which it
is communicated. The framework also considers factors
that impact the use of evidence, including both the mo-
tivation and capacity of the policy- or decision-maker,
and the extent to which evidence is aligned with their
prior beliefs and knowledge.
Inside track communication is based on personal or
professional relationships that operate from within thegovernment decision-making system, such as through dir-
ect engagement with decision-making bodies or through
active representation on governing councils and boards.
Such an approach allows the organization seeking to influ-
ence policy, to better understand the information needs of
decision-makers, to tailor messages accordingly and en-
sure that they reach policy makers in a timely manner.
The ‘outside track’ refers to communication that is gener-
ated outside of the government decision-making system
and is perceived as external to the system. While external
communication can sometimes result in a perception of
greater objectivity and lend credibility to the messages be-
cause the messages are not subject to internal pressures
and demands of the government decision-making system,
it may also limit opportunities for the ideas to be consid-
ered during internal government discussions.
Methods
The time period addressed by this analysis begins in
2005 and runs through to 2009, focusing on the period
during which NACP III was formulated and early years
of implementation.
The analysis is retrospective, conducted through docu-
ment review and semi-structured interviews that were
conducted between October 2010 and March 2011. Doc-
uments reviewed included NACP II and NACP III policy
documents, and guidelines and operating procedures
related to NACP III, Avahan communications including
monographs on best practice (BMGF 2008, 2009, and
2010), the Avahan Common Minimum Program, and
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in the development of NACP III were identified as
belonging to four main groups, namely: policy- and
decision-makers from NACO and State AIDS Control
Society (SACS); staff of multi- and bilateral aid agencies
and international organizations; civil society representa-
tives, particularly local academics and staff of NGOs
who were involved with the development of NACP III;
and foundation staff in India, and the staff of Avahan
implementing partners. Semi-structured interviews were
carried out with representatives from each of these
groups during the period October 2010 and March
2011, with 27 interviews conducted in total, relatively
evenly spread across each group.
Interview guides asked respondents to reflect on the
shifts between NACP II (1999 to 2006) and NACP III
(2006 to 2011) in both policy and implementation, probed
their understanding of why these shifts took place, and in
particular what role Avahan may have played in the shifts,
and then asked respondents to consider the nature of
communications from Avahan and the channels through
which influence was exercised.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Coding was
conducted using a framework approach, that is thought
to be particularly appropriate for health policy studies
[13]. The constructs in the conceptual framework were
used to identify an initial set of codes that were then
adapted and added to based on the content of the tran-
scripts. In analyzing findings we sought to triangulate
between four different stakeholder groups (government,
development partners, civil society, and foundation staff
and Avahan grantees, collectively referred to as ‘Avahan’),
to assess the extent to which there were similar perspec-
tives on the extent and nature of influence exercised by
Avahan. Findings reported below represent perspectives
that were shared across at least two stakeholder groups,
unless otherwise noted.
The research protocol and instruments were submit-
ted to Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Institutional Review Board which determined that this
was not human subjects research. Within India the YRG




NACP III was developed at a point where there was rec-
ognition that HIV/AIDS policy needed to change: this
perspective was driven by learning from NACP I and
NACP II, and was supported by a growing political com-
mitment to address HIV/AIDS in India. During the mid
2000s, around the time NACP III was being developed,
there was substantial debate about the scale of the epi-
demic in India [14-17] with some analysts asserting thatIndia was ‘on the brink of a significant epidemic’ [17].
Debates took place about whether the required response
should be that typically associated with a generalized or
concentrated epidemic [18,19].
NACO played a strong leadership role in the develop-
ment of NACP III and was wedded to an open, participa-
tory, and evidence-informed policy formulation process.
Planning started in early 2005 with a retreat to reflect on
lessons learned from NACP II, following which NACO
established a national planning team and developed a
framework for the new policy [20]. Fourteen thematic
working groups were established to address different pro-
gram areas (such as condom programming, financial man-
agement etc.). Program planning was conducted through
an extremely consultative process that included an online
consultation as well as face-to-face consultations at state
and national levels. A number of dialogues with develop-
ment partners (such as the World Bank, USAID, et al.)
were also hosted. These extensive consultations were per-
ceived to lend greater credibility to the final outcome:
‘. . .I mean talking about leadership, a lot of
mobilization at the political level had been done
through members of parliament—there was a
parliamentary group of MPs who were also active. So,
all that really lent support to the entire process and
one felt confident going about one’s task.’ (NACO #3)‘See, NACP I was basically administrative response,
because the country was not ready to face up to the
challenge. . .these great initiatives were taken during
NACP II. Now, NACP III, when this planning started,
we wanted to build on that.’ (NACO #1)‘I think everybody appreciated that it was such a
transparent and open process. I have never heard of
any national program to be so inclusive in the
development process, so inclusive and so open to
feedback and inputs, I have never seen that and I
don’t think it will ever happen like that again.’ (Civil
Society #2)
The nature and credibility of evidence
Although Avahan always intended to support research, it
did not have an explicit research agenda at the inception
of the program (it took time for the evaluation agenda
to be formulated and evaluation grants were only
awarded in June 2004). Further, at the time when plan-
ning for NACP III started, Avahan had less than two
years of operational experience. Avahan and its partners
generated lessons that were disseminated in the peer-
reviewed and grey literature but there were no substan-
tive publications at the time of NACP III planning, and
Avahan evidence did not appear to be a primary source
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of NACP III. When questioned about Avahan studies
that were considered during the NACP III development
process, none of the respondents interviewed recalled
any specific study by Avahan that was explicitly consid-
ered as evidence in the development of NACP III. This
may in part be due to the fact that draft reports and data
were already being shared with NACO and other stake-
holders prior to publication in journals:
‘I do think that the international publications have
been useful not so much internally but I think
globally those publications have been important. The
peer review journal publications have been important.’
(Avahan #6)‘. . .Publications, no not really except their study
[indiscernible] which, of course, took a long time and
that came out with some evidence. But their
presentations were. . . all along throughout the period
they would come up with some presentation. . .they
did give the data to say what was being done and so
on. . .’ (NACO #6)
While, the extent to which the research evidence gen-
erated by Avahan influenced NACP III was limited, best
practice evidence generated by Avahan, including the
lessons learned from routine implementation and man-
agement, contributed significantly to the development
process for NACP III. Specifically, the management of
the program with rigorous monitoring, the focus on
high-risk target populations—particularly the use of
differential strategies for each population, and use of
norms and standards were incorporated in NACP III.
These ‘best practices’ and lessons learned clearly reso-
nated with the Government of India (GOI) and NACO,
and had a significant impact on the overall develop-
ment of NACP III:
‘. . .the best way to make the government agencies to
look at you and say oh, these are the experience of
this agency,. . .It is primarily making a sharing
exercises. It is something like a workshop like or a
seminar like activity in which the senior level top
officials of the government are invited and they do
some sort of a sharing of the experiences. . .all those
things contributed significantly in the formulation of
the NACP III.’ (NACO #2)
In addition to disseminating its best practices, Avahan
also facilitated many field visits that allowed NACO and
other stakeholders to see firsthand how the programs
were operating. A senior member of the NACO staff
recalled the impact of visiting an Avahan site and seeingthe work being carried out and the impression that it
made. This ‘tacit evidence’ appeared to be influential in
policy formulation and especially during the implemen-
tation of NACP III:
‘My visit to the Gates funded program in Mysore, and
there I saw for myself. . .So, I did think at that time
that if this was possible in such a short period of time
through program inputs in a focused manner being
provided, then it should be possible to scale it up
throughout the country too. So, the concept of scaling
up really came with my visit there.’ (NACO #6)
Avahan’s credibility was an important factor in facili-
tating the influence that it was able to achieve. This
credibility was earned and not accorded to Avahan
simply because it was a product of BMGF. In fact, as a
relative newcomer to the HIV/AIDS scene, Avahan was
initially met with a certain degree of skepticism that
needed to be overcome. However, through the successful
implementation and scale up of its targeted intervention
programs, Avahan gained credibility within the eyes of
NACO and other stakeholders. In particular respondents
noted the business acumen that Avahan brought to
HIV/AIDS prevention and scale-up, and recognized the
management expertise it offered. Avahan credibility
therefore was due to its ability to generate and docu-
ment positive results following the implementation of
activities. This perception was shared among other
stakeholders in different states and was a facilitating
factor for Avahan to be able to influence programs
across India. It also served to reinforce the value of the
program to the government. As indicated by several
respondents:
‘That Avahan was successful. . .Otherwise people in
other states would not have asked us to ask Avahan to
extend their program to their states. So, that was an
indicator that the Avahan was popular.’ (NACO #1)‘So there were many who try to influence them but
didn’t manage and then there were some who
managed because it resonated.’ (Int'l Organization #3)
The credibility gained from early successes facilitated
the uptake of information by target audiences. This ap-
pears to have created a virtuous cycle: as the government
began to accept the work of Avahan, this lent further
credibility to Avahan and its learning.
Influence channels
Avahan and its partners employed a number of channels
to communicate lessons learned to the Government of
India and other stakeholders, from hosting site visits to
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publication of in-country reports, newsletters, and from
2008 onwards monographs, and to a lesser extent peer-
reviewed literature. As summarized in Table 1, some of
these approaches allowed Avahan to exercise influence
within government decision-making processes (inside
track), while others communicated lessons to a broader
audience, external to government (outside track). The
types of evidence communicated varied among the com-
munication channels. Research evidence was largely used
to communicate to external organizations, while best
practices and tacit evidence were shared more frequently
through 'inside' channels of communication. The majority
of Avahan communication activities were carried out dur-
ing implementation phases of NACP III when Avahan had
more knowledge on best practices that could be scaled up.
Avahan’s effectiveness in influencing policy implemen-
tation and practice was achieved primarily by inside-
track communication where it engaged with NACO and
SACS on a more personal level and in many respectsTable 1 Avahan influence strategies for the development of N
Strategy Type of evidence Communicat
Site-visits




Personal contact with NACO Best Practice
Research Inside Track
Tacit Knowledge
Participation on NACP III Workgroups
Best Practice Inside Track
Research
Guidelines Best Practice Inside Track
Research
Reports/Monographs
Best Practice Outside Track
Staffing support for NACO Best Practice Inside Track
Tacit Knowledge
Management of TSUs Best Practice Inside Track
Tacit Knowledge
Peer-reviewed literature Research Outside Trackintegrated itself into NACO. Avahan supported advisory
staff positions within NACO that enabled it to access in-
ternal discussions and dialogues at which few other ex-
ternal agencies were present. Positioned within NACO,
foundation and Avahan staff were able to engage in in-
formal communications, participate in executive meetings,
and other working group discussions where data were
presented and informal exchanges of ideas took place.
This close relationship with the government was a key fac-
tor in Avahan’s influence on NACP III and was something
that even those outside of NACO and Avahan observed:
‘. . .the fact that Avahan participated directly in
supporting NACO and putting staff inside NACO to
help with the implementation of NACP III . . .. . ..have
made things much easier. So the perception was
definitely better this time.’ (Int'l Organization #1)‘. . .by embedding themselves within the national
program in the form of trying to help in puttingACP-III
ion channel Target audience Timing of communication
Govt (NACO)




Multilateral Org During, Post-NACP III Development
Civil Society
During, Post-NACP III Development
Govt (NACO)
Govt (NACO)
Multilateral Org During NACP III Development
Civil Society
Govt (NACO) Post-NACP III Development
Civil Society
Govt (NACO)
Multilateral Org During, Post-NACP III Development
Civil Society
International
Govt (NACO) Post-NACP III Development
Govt (SACS) Post-NACP III Development
Govt (NACO) Post-NACP III Development
Multilateral Org
International
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something that contributed to the advancement of the
implementation.. . .’ (Civil Society #7)‘You just cannot say, ‘Okay let me teach you what it is
and go in for two hours.’ It does not work. So, that is
what does not work. And, therefore, what works – if
you sit with people for a year – and that’s what I
mean, ‘sit with people;’ not sit saying, ‘I will come for
one day today and one day after one month.’ So, the
only other way is to sit for at least two to three years
full time with people – which is what we did. . .. The
same logic holds true during the SACS where you
would work with them to place multiple people in the
SACS who worked in Avahan and, so, there is transfer
of knowledge by, actually, working together as
opposed to only presenting presentations. So, I would
say that by far, that is the biggest. . .’ (Avahan #2)
Being positioned within NACO also helped to generate
greater NACO ownership of lessons derived from Avahan.
There was consensus from all stakeholder groups that
these ‘inside track’ approaches to communication, greatly
contributed to Avahan’s credibility and influence.
Although Avahan focused more on ‘inside track’ com-
munication channels, it did to a lesser extent employ
‘outside track’ channels of communication. This commu-
nication served largely to increase visibility and to stimu-
late discussions of the Avahan model internationally more
than to communicate with the Government of India and
other stakeholders in India. These types of communica-
tion were also important for shaping Avahan’s recognition
and credibility globally. Overall, Avahan appeared to neg-
lect communications with stakeholders in India outside of
government and did not apply the same ‘inside track’
strategies to their engagement with other donors and
international organizations, this occasionally led to mis-
trust on the part of such actors.
Impacts of Avahan influence
Changes in attitudes
Respondents identified a number of substantial shifts in
attitude between NACP II and NACP III, noting in par-
ticular shifting perspectives towards working at scale,
the role of the community, and the use of data and evi-
dence. The issue of scale was the area where the most
dramatic shift in perspective occurred and this was
widely seen by respondents. While there was a shift in
attitude towards the necessary scale for implementing
targeted interventions in particular, the government was
also perceived to be intent on scaling up many other ser-
vices, such as treatment services. The second area where
a substantive shift in attitude occurred was around com-
munity mobilization, with a much more prominent rolegiven to communities. Finally, with respect to the use of
evidence, respondents observed an intensified effort dur-
ing NACP III to use evidence for program monitoring
and planning.
Interviews gave a nuanced picture of Avahan’s contri-
bution to changes in attitudes, which is reinforced by
the broader picture (described above) of the context in
which NACP III was developed. Concerning scale up, re-
spondents within NACO thought that the Avahan ex-
perience did influence perception of the feasibility of
scaling up, primarily through a demonstration effect. In
terms of a shift towards evidence-based planning, some
respondents including those from NACO attributed an
important role to Avahan, but there were clearly
multiple other influential factors. One representative of
an international organization noted that this issue was
one where ‘a lot of partners also were helping the
Government to get to that point’ (International
Organization #5), and the stronger emphasis upon evi-
dence use in planning could be seen as a natural evolu-
tion with a gradually growing sophistication in planning
and policy approaches.
Changes in policy
The policy shifts that took place built upon the attitu-
dinal shifts described above. First, while HIV/AIDS pre-
vention was as much a focus of NACP II as NACP III,
during NACP II much of the preventive focus of targeted
interventions was on ‘composite groups [14]. Thus, a sin-
gle targeted intervention frequently addressed multiple
different types of most at-risk populations [21]. NACP III
focused targeted interventions on a particular most at-risk
population and indeed a whole section in NACP III covers
‘differential strategies’ that distinguish between different
populations. Most groups of actors interviewed acknowl-
edged a role for Avahan in terms of ensuring a clear em-
phasis upon targeted interventions for target populations:
‘Avahan has shown how do you choose the most
strategic population, more strategic intervention, put
their money in and get the key results, the most
effective results’ (Civil Society #4).
However, the focus on targeted interventions was sup-
ported by emerging evidence, and could also be viewed as
a natural progression in the development of the program.
Of the different aspects of policy change between
NACP II and NACP III, there are a few additional areas
where Avahan’s contribution stands out, such as the
focus on community-based organizations. NACP III also
reflected a stronger focus on strengthening capacities,
and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. While
the Avahan program certainly supported a strong focus
on M&E and capacity development, it appears that
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policy development stage, and more in terms of provid-
ing practical support to implementing NACO’s vision
(see changes in practice below). Other important aspects
of the policy shift between NACP II and NACP III, such
as the focus on decentralization and integration with
existing services, were not part of Avahan’s influence
agenda and appear to have been brought about by other
forces, particularly those internal to government.
Changes in practice
Avahan’s contribution was particularly great in terms of
changes in practice. Respondents identified a number of
areas where practice changed during the implementation
of NACP III. One notable area where Avahan appeared
to have had a significant impact was around improve-
ments in the M&E systems with tracking systems for dif-
ferent high-risk groups and stronger data management
established throughout the system (NACO #2, 4, 5, 7
and International organization #2). Several respondents
traced this effect back to Avahan. One specific example
given concerned the critical link between pay and per-
formance. While it is a hallmark of Avahan that NGOs
are tightly held to performance criteria it is typically rare
for governments to cancel contracts due to non-
performance, but one respondent cited the fact that
under NACP III, NACO had cancelled a lot of contracts
with underperforming NGOs as evidence of Avahan in-
fluence in this field.
In terms of the management of the program, there
was a general sense from respondents that the imple-
mentation of NACP III was ‘much more professional’
(Civil society #2) and ‘highly structured’ (Civil society
#1) with a stronger focus on getting ‘better results at dis-
trict level’ (International Organization #4). Respondents
from all the different respondent groups articulated an
important role for Avahan in terms of influencing the
overall management approach taken to NACP III:
‘Early days those were the things that we religiously got
out under [name] leadership but we got all of these
documents written up and documented various critical
aspects of our program. So at least it was on paper that
this is how it works within Avahan whether it’s crisis
management, whether it’s IDU programming,
whether it’s MSM programming etcetera. So stuff
has been documented in terms of monographs.’
(Avahan #1)‘I think Avahan has enormous capacity to carry things
forward to its endpoint particularly in planning. And
therefore I would rate it as – the states are actually
embracing the Avahan inputs quite significantly.’
(Civil Society #7)‘It comes out from a strong management system that
they produced. I think that model is what NACP III
can learn from.’ (Civil Society #4)
Specific management examples given included the
clear supervisory structure which was developed under
NACP III with every ten targeted interventions (TIs)
having one supervisor assigned to oversee them
(NACO #6, Civil Society #1). The presence of one super-
visor for every ten targeted interventions was also seen
to be a very direct influence of Avahan, building directly
on Avahan’s own standards. Further, standards were de-
veloped that required the supervisor to make regular
(monthly) visits to each TI:
‘BMGF . . ...sort of convey this requirement that
program management at NACO level for the TIs is
also a great requirement and that is how they sort of
asked them to increase—or what do you say—
strengthen the program management at TI, of TIs at
NACO level.’ (NACO #4)
Finally, Avahan played a critical role in the develop-
ment of the quasi-governmental technical units (known
as technical support units) that advised NACO and SACS.
While these entities existed prior to NACP III they were
considerably strengthened during NACP III, and Avahan
played a significant role in this. Technical support units
(TSU) were established at the National level (NTSU) with
specific technical support groups (TSGs) for the condom
and trucker programs. These units provided support on
priority setting, management, and funding. At the state
levels, TSUs provided technical and managerial support
for program implementation. Staff from Avahan and other
international organizations cited these units as well as the
development of operational guidance to help facilitate im-
plementation of best practice models, as being a substan-
tive component of their work in India:
‘We worked with them for two years to write the
operational guidelines which were all based on
Avahan learnings, including the community
mobilisation aspects.... And without exaggeration,
there must be some 50 tools which were used, and
they were all given to NACO in NACP III.’ (Avahan #2)‘So, all those guidelines were being prepared. What I
saw was the products which were progressively
getting much better and I was told that the technical
members of the Avahan people, they participate in
these guidelines.’ (Int’l Organization #5)‘Half our effort with NACO is really on the
institutional mechanisms, which have been the
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Support Unit and the Technical Support Groups and
how to set it up, and what is their role and defining
all that.’ (Avahan #2)
Avahan championed such structures, and the manage-
ment style that Avahan advocated for—a strong focus on
results, close monitoring and supervision—required sub-
stantial technical oversight. Perhaps for these reasons,
several respondents saw these quasi-governmental agen-
cies as being very much an Avahan creation, although
the first such technical support units were actually cre-
ated with support from the United Kingdom Depart-
ment for International Development and were known as
program support units. Further, Avahan directly sup-
ported the National Technical Support Unit, the Tech-
nical Support Units in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, and
both the condom and truckers Technical Support Groups.
Discussion
There were undoubtedly many factors that influenced
the development of NACP III. Avahan was one among
several factors that contributed to the policy development
process and had some success in influencing NACP III.
Much of its influence was exercised during the implemen-
tation period, and focused on the management and oper-
ational procedures necessary for implementing prevention
activities, particularly those involving most at risk popula-
tions. Avahan’s influence during the period of formulating
NACP III was less marked. While Avahan staff partici-
pated actively on working groups that were responsible
for formulating NACP III this process occurred very early
during the life of Avahan. Certainly, shifts between NACP
II and NACP III reflect some of the critical points that
Avahan was seeking to promote, but informants did not
describe a major role for Avahan at this juncture. It should
be noted that it was not until very recently (during the
period that this research was conducted) that Avahan de-
veloped an explicit strategy for its influence.
Avahan’s influence was based in good part on evi-
dence, however the most influential forms of evidence
appear to have been best practice evidence, notably op-
erational norms and guidelines, and to some extent tacit
evidence derived from field visits by government staff to
Avahan service delivery sites. What is typically thought
of as ‘evidence,’ particularly research findings, or scientific
data from surveillance systems, appears to have had less
impact. However, this finding needs to be interpreted with
caution. First, and for the reasons of timing noted above,
Avahan was more influential during policy implementa-
tion than policy formulation. Questions concerning imple-
mentation require studies of processes that were not the
focus of Avahan’s investment in research, which primarily
explored trends in the epidemic, and conducting impactevaluations of interventions. While the findings from im-
pact evaluations are likely to be relevant to questions re-
garding the effectiveness of the Avahan model, these types
of studies do not answer the ‘how to’ questions that are
critical to the replication and scale up of programs. Sec-
ond, Avahan staff stated that they shared data on trends in
the epidemic with counterparts at NACO as it became
available, however frequently this data was shared in dis-
cussions within government prior to it having been for-
mally written up, and was not presented in the form of
scientific papers or summaries. Accordingly respondents
within government may have been exposed to this evi-
dence, but not necessarily viewed it as scientific data or re-
search evidence, perhaps rather viewing it as expert advice
on the nature of the unfolding epidemic.
In this case, a hallmark of the nature of communica-
tion, was that most critical communication occurred
through the ‘inside track.’ Virtually all the actors
interviewed, pointed to the fact that Avahan had effect-
ively embedded itself within NACO, as being key to the
influence that it wielded. The BMGF is in many respects
a non-traditional donor. Unlike the World Bank or well-
established bilateral development agencies, it does not
have clearly defined channels for communicating with
government (for example through systems of aide-
memoires, missions, etc). Even within the BMGF, the
Avahan program was atypical in terms of the intensity of
its interaction with government. In terms of wielding
influence, the position of the BMGF created both advan-
tages and disadvantages. First, particularly during the
early days of Avahan, the credibility of the program and
hence evidence from the program was fragile, and
Avahan did not have automatic access to policy discus-
sions, compared to perhaps better-established develop-
ment partners. However unlike some of the other
partners, Avahan did have considerable flexibility in pro-
gramming and this enabled it to be responsive and fast.
Avahan’s ability to respond rapidly to NACO’s need for
additional technical resources to support implementa-
tion enabled it to position itself to exert influence within
NACO. It is possible, though not certain, that this strat-
egy may have led to some resentment from other devel-
opment partners, as described above.
BMGF brought significant financial resources to ad-
dress the HIV/AIDS epidemic in India, and indeed 69%
of the budget for NACP III is being met by development
partners [22]. India, however, is obviously an emerging
economic superpower and thus one might expect such
financial contributions to secure less influence than in
more donor-dependent contexts. Indeed, it appears that
in order to exert policy influence, Avahan needed to
deploy its support strategically, particularly through
funding positions within NACO and the Technical Sup-
port Units.
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This study set out to assess the impact of Avahan on the
development of NACP III, and accordingly while probes
in the interview guides did ask about the roles of other
actors in influencing NACP III, this was not the focus of
our analysis. The interviews were conducted several
years after the first steps in development of NACP III
policy, and thus it may have been difficult for respon-
dents to remember precise details of discussions. While
this may have been problematic, we do not believe that
it led to any systematic bias in responses. There was also
variation in the exposure of the respondents to the overall
policy development process, which hindered the ability of
some interviewees to respond to some of the questions in
the discussion guide. There is also typically a tendency
among respondents to portray their role in a positive
manner. In this case, some of the respondents may have
attributed a greater role for themselves and/or their
organization in the development and implementation of
NACP III. Similarly, there is an incentive for government
respondents to minimize the influence of external agents
in their retelling of policy development processes. While it
is inevitable that some degree of bias is present in these
results, the inclusion of multiple stakeholders in this ana-
lysis and triangulation between stakeholders helps to en-
sure a more comprehensive view of the process and
mitigates to some extent, the impact of the potential bias.
Conclusion
This study sought to assess the influence of one particu-
lar development partner on a specific policy in India,
and the role that evidence played in mediating this rela-
tionship. While the BMGF has been a major funder of
HIV/AIDS prevention in India, given the circumstances
their financial clout was not the primary factor explaining
any influence that they exerted. Instead Avahan’s ability to
influence the policy debate rested primarily upon the
knowledge and experience that the Avahan program em-
bodied. While studies of knowledge translation typically
focus primarily on scientific evidence, this study suggests
that other forms of evidence, notably best practice evi-
dence derived from program experience, and disseminated
through personal communication, can be particularly in-
fluential. This best practice evidence was supplemented by
the knowledge and experience of the many Foundation
and Avahan partner staff who worked within government
bringing tacit evidence from the Avahan experience to
bear. Finally, and particularly during the policy formula-
tion stage, field trips and personal testimony appear to
have been effective influence strategies. This contrasts
with typical studies of evidence influence that focus prin-
cipally on the role of research.
The framework (Figure 2) that underpins this paper
provides a useful tool to analyze how evidence is used toexert influence. To date, there have been relatively few
attempts to document or analyze the instrumental use of
evidence in policy debates, and we encourage the further
application of this framework in studies of this nature.
While the growing efforts to support knowledge transla-
tion in LMICs are valuable, they need to more clearly
take account of the many ways in which evidence
already enters policy debates, such as through the inter-
ventions of development partners.
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